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H – 668

International Court of Justice

H0668 - 0002

Documentbook

Hermann G o e r i n g

introduced

by Defense Counsel

Dr. Otto S t a h m e r
attornev at law.

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Exhibit Goering Nr. 1

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excerpts from the letter of

General Smuts to Pre s ident Wilson

of 3o May 1919

(quoted from Berger "The Dictate of Versailles" Essen 1939. p. 94/95

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Exhibit Goering No 1

From the

Letter written by General Smuts to President Wilson on May 30. 1919.

The German reply to the peace conditions established by us, seems to me to sound a fundamental note, which is the most dangerous one for us, and which we must consider with utmost care. Their basic contention is that we have the solemn obligation towards them to conclude a Wilson peace, a peace in accordance with yours 14 points and other principles, announced in 1918. There is no doubt whatsoever in my opinion, that this is so. With the exception of the two reservations made by the Allies before the armistice, we are obliged to conclude a peace within the framework of the four corner-pillars of your points and principles. And all the conditions of the peace treaty, which , by their aims and purposes, are opposed to this framework or go beyond it, would represent a violation of the agreement.

This seems absolutely clear to me, and it is a question of the facts of the case, as to whether there are such conditions. If they do exist, then our position is actually a serious one, at least as I understand it. This war started with a breaking of a solemn, international promise, and it was one of our noblest war-aims, to protect international right and the sanctity of international obligations. In case the Allies end the war by follwing Germany's example at the start, and face the world in the same manner with a "scrap of paper", then our shame will be so great that I shudder when I think of the final effect on public opinion. Indeed, we would place on our shoulders a greater wrong than Germany did, on account of everything which happened since August 1914 and because of the terrible light, directed exactly to this point.

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Frankly, I do not believe that this is the case, and it seems to me that the Germans produce plausible legal reasons in regard to a number of the conditions. All the onesided conditions, which exclude interchangeability or equality of rights, and all the needle points with which the treaty abounds seem to me to violate the letter and the spirit of your points. I am not able to discover anything in the points and the principles, which could justify for instance the onesided internationalization of German rivers and the absolutely bad and onesided administration, which is provided in this regard. Reparations by means of coal delivery cannot cover the agreements, which have been made in connection with the Saarbasin and its population. I even doubt that the occupation of the Rhein for 15 years corresponds with the letter and the spirit of your points and principles, and there are still many other points, to which I would not wish to refer, but which will without any doubt, be taken under consideration by your advisers.

There will be a terrible disappointment if, the peoples (nations) arrive at the conclusion that we did not conclude a Wilson peace, that we do not keep our promises to the world and that we are not true to the public. If we do so, it will seem that we would break the formal agreement, which we have concluded in full consciousness (as I at least believe) and we shall be covered with the greatest shame, and this peace could very well mean a still greater disaster for the world than was the war.

Excuse me, that I trouble you with this matter but I believe that it concerns itself with the root of our entire cause.

Yours very truly J.C. Smuts.

(: Baker; Woodrow Wilson, volume III, p 466 ff - D. Baker; Woodrow
German translation, v. III S Wilson, (Berber p. 94, 95
p. 4o2 ff.)

I hereby certify that the document reproduced above is a true copy from the letter of General Smuts to President Wilson dated May 3o, 1919.

sgd. Dr. Otto Stahmer
Attorney at Law and Notary
Public

Nurnberg, February 25, 1946.

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Exhibit Nr. 2

Excerpt:

from the letter of

General Smuts to LLoyd George
of May 26, 1919

(quoted from Berger "The Dictate of Versailles" Essen 1939 p. 87/93)

Exh. Goering Nr.2

From the

Letter of General Smuts

to Lloyd George, from May 22, 1919.

"I would certainly withdraw from the French and Belgian manufacturers the authority to run around in German plants for the purpose of robbing these of their machinery, which they may deem necessary for their own plants. (Par. 4 of the 4th supplement to the reparation clauses). Such industrial looting would only be extremely harmful and could not be justified in times of peace as a measure of reprisal for crimes, which had been committed during the war.

4. Germany's Eastern Frontier.

I am convinced that we not only turn over the verdict of history with the undue engrandizement of Poland, but also commit a cardinal political error, which will find its revenge within the course of history. The new Poland will comprise millions of Germans (and Russians) and territories with a German (and Russian) population or territories, which have been parts of Germany (or Russia) for long periods. We may assume with certainty that Germany (as well as Russia) will become great powers again, and that Poland, sandwiched between them, can only bloom by their good will. How can we expect under such circumstances that Poland could become anything else, but a failure, even if she did possess the necessary abilities to govern and administrate herself which, as history has proved, she does not posses

Even now, as the conference is in session, the Poles defy the great powers; what then will happen in the future, if the great powers are divided and argue among themselves ? I believe, we are about to build a house on flying sand. And in view of this and numerous other considerations, I would subject the frontiers of Poland, as they have been fixed temporarily by the peace treaty, to a revision, - leave Upper Silesia and all genuine German territories to Germany, narrow the borders of the free city of Danzig,

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and leave them under the sovereignty of Germany with an administration, subordinate to the League of Nations, instead of placing them under the sovereignty of Poland, as we suggested it. I think that the long occupation of the Rhine and the more extensive engrandizement of Poland, as it was planned during the war, are the two cardinal errors of the peace treaty. Both of these mistakes represent a great danger to the further peace of Europe, and I insist upon it that every means should be applied, to eliminate them before it is too late. It is not too late yet, there is no doubt that the German delegates are about to resist strongly and will, perhaps, make the signing of the peace treaty subject to the revision of their Eastern frontiers in Silesia, East- and West Prussia. I would advise that we consider extremely carefull and corresponding to its importance all the pros and cons of this matter, pursued by them (the Germans).

6. The military and airplane clauses.

According to my opinion, we are doing wrong in reducing Germany's Army to a maximum strength of 100.000 men: I hold that such an armed force is absolutely inadequats for the necessary police and defense purposes, for such a big population in such a state of internal fermentation and with frontiers and neighbors such as Germany has them. We are forced to keep in readyness more than 100.000 men to keep up and maintain order in Ireland during the last period of the war, and Germany's situation is much more serious. We should be willing to listen to the objections, which will be raised by the German delegates in this matter.

I also believe it wrong to rob Germany entirely of her tanks and airplanes. These things have grown to form a part of the equipment of a well organized army, and we should be ready

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to let her have the necessary quota of tanks and airplanes for her small army. The same goes for the air-craft and naval planes which are needed for her reduced fleet.

There is a decree that all the hangars for airplanes within a distance of 150 kilometers of the Eastern, Western and Southern borders of Germany shall be destroyed. This is by far too drastic and actually unnecessary, if not unfeasible. The peace treaty abounds in similar pin pricks, which only represent the moods of subordinate officials, and this should not appear in the peace treaty in its final version.

7. International Rivers and Railroads.

Whilst the internationalization of Germany's rivers and rail-roads, which provides exits for the new States, seems to be a thoroughly sound priciple, the administration, provided for these river and rail roads, appears as entirely out of the question. These rivers should be administrated by committees, which should include a small minority of German representatives, and this should apply even to those rivers, which are exclusively German.

8. Pin-pricks.

As I already emphasized, the treaty is full of small and relativly, unimportant terms, which do not serve any useful purpose, but must hurt and injure unnecessarily the feelings of a beaten enemy. Even if one formulates the peace in such a harsh and severe manner, as Germany deserves it according to the method of her warfare, we should endeavor to eliminate all traces of petty chicanery and ill will, which can not serve such a great cause as ours, nor further the interests of future good will and future peace.

I am for a drastic revision of all such pin-pricks; they mainly refer to the treatment of German subjects and German

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property and German right. But one may find them in almost every paragraph of the peace treaty.

I am not only worried that the German sign a fair and good peace treaty, but also that they, for the sake of the future, to use this term, are not forced at the point of bayonet to sign it. It should be made impossible for the German people to discredit the treaty morally later on. And for this reason I deem it important that we bring the German delegates over to our side to such an extent that we listen to what they have to say; that we give them every possible explanation and that in all cases where our claims really can not be maintained, we should be ready to accept changes or compromises..

(E. Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson and Wordls Settlement. London 1923, Vol.III, p.458 ff. - D. Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson. Memoirs and Documents. Authorized German translation by Curt Thesing. Leipzig o.J. Vol.III, p.395)

(From Berber, "Das Diktat von Versailles" Essen 1939, pp.87 - 93)

I herewith certify that the document reproduced above is a true copy from the letter of General Smuts to Lloyd George dated 22 May 1919 (Quoted from Berber, "Das Diktat von Versailles", Essen 1939, pp.87 - 93).

Nuernberg, 25 February 1946.

signed Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Defense Counsel and
Notary Public.

Exhibit Goering Nr. 3

Excerpt:

General I.F.C. Fuller

"Total War"

article in "army Ordonance"
Nr. 99 (USA) extract

(quoted from "Defense Spirit Abroad"
13th year, issued 2, Febr. 1937).

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Exhibit Goering No. 3

Defense Thoughts of foreign countries.

13 year, vol. 2, February 1937

Total War fare

the danger, which exists for collective security by a rapid attack.

By General J.F.C. Fuller (England)

("Army Ordnance", Nr. 99 USA)

Excerpt.

The German Reich was even forced into a true "Despotism of poverty. This, together with the Ruhr invasion - the corner stone of mischief - inavoidably lead to a complete surpression of liberty. In Germany man, woman and child had only the liberty left - to starve -, together with the financial breakdown, a moral breakdown occured. The result was that authority in its entire extent was taken over completely by the State. But the burocracy did not understand to use its power and for that reason cleared the road for Hitler.

When he came to power, he was an impersonation of the renaissance thought, which had slumbered during ten years within the heart of every good German. It was exactly as Carlyle wrote, almost a hundred years ago; "What he says everybody is going to say, or would like to say it. All spirit are lifted up like awakened from a magic slumber by his thoughts. All answer with a glad "yes".

Hitler was Germany's speaker. All circumstances helped to make him the man of the hour; the missary of his fellow citizens and the hope, which he impersonated; the economical breakdown and the energy, which is necessary for reconstruction; even all studies, which he did not have, acte favorably, for this gave him independence - from antiquated systems and teachings, and directed his progressive spirit to the future.

Hitler had lived through the war in his receptive years of youth . He had learned to know but the ugly side of war and its destruction.

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militarilly. In this case all terrors of a long war and all evil consequences would have been avoided. As a witness of the destruction of his fatherland, he recognized that everybody comitted a sin towards Germany, who would not try everything, to stop a repetation of such a catastrophy.

If one understands this mental orientation, Hitler's action appeared only logical. If the salvation of the fatherland is recognized as the highest moral duty, the result is that all actions pertaining to this, are justified. What did Hitler do? He started to re-establish the unity, dignity and disciplin of the people. He decided to create a selfsufficient Nation and to protect it by a modern Armed Force. It is nonsens, to state that he wanted war. A war could not bring him the renaissance of the Nation. What he needed was a honorable and secured peace. But as he was a realist as well as an idealist, and as he comprehended that a war is nothing improbable in time, the only thing he was affraid of was not the war in itself, but a war like the last one.

Hitler did not believe, as Marx did, that man is lead by material needs. He recognized that now-a-days the main impuls is a strong national feeling and that man gladly is willing to sacrifice life and liberty for it. Hitler aimed at unity by creating his Totalitarian State. He felt that a new spirit was needed. Without reestablishing national dignity this could not be achieved. Therefore he tore up the Versailles treaty. He also recognized that the unity could not be reached without discipline of the whole nation. Therefore he regulated the whole German daily life and introduced compulsory military service. He further saw that selfsufficiency is the basis of modern war-fare; therefore he aimed at economic independence.

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Finally he recognized that this new structure would have been built on sand only, without the protection of a strong Armed Force. Hitler never believed that everything could be achieved by force, but he is convinced that in our violant times everything has to be founded on might.

As he feared a repetition of a war in the way of the last one, it was impossible for him to go hand in hand with those states forming the League of Nations. The reason was not only that these states wanted to adhere to the Versailles treaty, but that they refused to wage a war, to be conducted with "Sientific Weapons". Therefore they wished that the next war should be conducted in the manner of the last war, which had destroyed Germany. That this is correct can be seen clearly not only from the economic sanctions, provided in the Statut of the League of Nations, which would only be effective during a long war, but also from all disarmament conferences held since 1919. The democratic powers have tried here again and again to restrict the so-called attack wepons, so that the next war could be prolonged . Sowjet Russia has given her support in this matter, because the communist dictators know very well, that a future, long war must end with the bolshevisation of Europe.

I herwith certify that the document reproduced above is a true copy from the essay "Total War" from General J.F.C.Fuller (Quoted from "Defense Thoughts of Foreign Countries", 13th year, Vol. 2)

Nuernberg, 26 February 1946

signed: Dr. Otto Stahmer

Attorney-at-law and notary.

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Exhibit Goering Nr. 4

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excerpts from

The Constituation of the
German Reich

(Weimar Constituation)

of 11 Aug. 1919

a rt. 118, 124, 125.

Exh. Goering No.4.

From the Weimar Constitution

Article 118.

Every German has the right, within the limits of the general laws to express his opinionsfreely in speech writing, print picture form, or in any other manner. No labor or employee/relationship must restrict this right, nobody is permitted to discriminate against him if he uses this right.

No censorship is allowed, but in the case of moving pictures deviations from this law may be established by law. In fighting pornographic and trashy literature as well as for the protection of the youth at public spectacles and performances, legal measures are admissable.

Article 124

All Germans have the right, to form clubs and societies for purposes, not contrary to criminal law. This right can-not be restricted by preventive measures. The same provisions apply to religious clubs and societies.

Every association may become incorporated in accordance with regulations of the civil law. This can-not be denied to any club for reason of the club's pursuing political, social political or religious aims.

Article 125.

Free elections and the secret ballot are guaranteed. The electional laws shall determine the details.

I herewith certify that the document reproduced above, is a true copy from the Weimar Constitution.

Nuernberg, February 25,1946.

signed
Dr. Otto Stahmer,
Attorney-at-Law and Notary Public.

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Exhibit Goering Nr. 5

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excerpts from the book by:

Sir Nevil Henderson

"Failure of a Mission"

L o n d o n 194o

(page 25)

It would be quite wrong not to realize that a great number of people who followed Hitler and the Nazi regime and worked for them, were honest idealists, whose only object was to serve Germany, to improve the masses of their people and to contribute to their happiness. It is possible that Hitler himself was such an idealist in the beginning. Later on, he undoubtedly used this idealism as a pretext to justify the continued existence of the regime and its leaders, But there were others who remained faithful to their principles, and I left Germany with feelings of high esteem for men like Dr. Guertner, the Minister of Justice, Count Schwerin-Krosigk, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Lammers, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, as well as for many others in different branches of German public life. Of all qualities of the German race its organizational ability is singular, and Germany owes much to the astonishing organizational abilities of men like Fieldmarshal Goering, Dr. Frick, Minister of the Interior, Dr. Todt, the director for road- and building construction, Mr. Hierl, the leader of the Reich labor service and likewise the soldiers, sailors and aviators who built up the machine and helped Germany to regain its present noteworthy position. Most of us would have been proud to do for our own country what these and other men did for theirs. One should not blame the machine but the purposes for which it was employed and the spirit which was behind it.

I herewith certify that the above reproducted document is a true copy from the book by Sir Nevile Henderson "Failure of a Mission", London 1940.

Nuernberg 21 February 1946.

(signed) Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Defense Counsel

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[redacted] Filed March 22, 1946

Read

Exhibit Goering Nr. 6

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excerpts from the speech :

"Of the benefits of the Folk Community" to the Winter Relief in the K rupp Works in Essen 4 Dec. 1934

(quoted from Hermann Goering "speeches a nd essa ys" Munich 1938 page 174-176)

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excerpts from this book have a lrea dy been presented through the prosecution under the number PS 34 41 and PS 346o).

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Exhibit Goering No 6

From the speech:

"Of the blessings of an Ethnic Community"

occasioned by the Winter-Air-Organization , delivered in the Krupp Works in Essen on 4 December, 1944.

P. 174)para.3)

P. 176 (para.1)

....., and look, we have always been told reproachfully: yes, this militarism, this war mongery. No, and a nation without honor and defense is also without peace, and if an English statesman declared a few days ago that an unarmed, defenseless nation provoked unrest he may consider at the same time, please, that what ever holds true for England holds also true for Germany. We, too, are of the opinion, that a nation without honor and defense has lost its peace at the same time. We have felt it on our own body. We have felt what it means to be without domestic and foreign peace. Today, we want to secure this peace and we want the world to understand that, time and time again: only a Germany with honor guarantees world peace. Only a free German nation will keep this peace and will know how to preserve this peace.

Therefore, we demand for us the same rights as possessed by the others. But for this reason we know, too, that other nations as well will find the hour for a true understanding which is always possible only between equal and equally partners, never, though, between the strong and the weak

Page 175 (16the line from below)

If the great white nations will not find a way to get together, they may bear in mind that they are moving towards a twilight of the gods. The white man cannot become a slave. The white man is destined to lead the world.

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and may the white nations keep this in mind. One must not exclude the most gifted and most industrious people, it just won't work, it is against nature, we have reared up against it and we shall resist it to our last breath.

We do not want any war, but we want our honor. We do not discuss this honor with anybody in this world, that is a fact, for it is the foundation for the reconstruction of the entire nation. Only he who has a sharp sword at his side has rest and peace. . It is not true that this provokes war. No, if one is defenseless, it may provoke others to attack and to rob him. But if he knows how to defend himself, his peace will be secure, too, and thus the peace of the whole world.

From Hermann Goering, "Speeches and Essays"

Munich, 1938, pp. 174-176.

I hereby certify that the above reproduced document is a true copy from the speech: "Of the Blessings of an Ethnic Community" occasioned by the Winter-Aid-Organization, delivered in the Krupp Works in Essen on 4 December, 1934.

Nuernberg, 25 February, 1946

(signed) Dt. Stahmer

Defense Counsel

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Exhibit Goering Nr. 7

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excerpt from the

Pea ce Treaty of Versailkes of
28 June 1919

a rticle 8 a nd prea mbel to
pa rt V (before a rticle 159)

(Reichsges etzblatt 1919 p. 687 ff
723, 919.)

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Exhibit Goering Nr. 7

Excerpt from

the Peace Treaty of Versailles

of 28 June, 1919.

Article 8

The members of the League profess the principle that the maintenance of peace requires a decrease of national armaments to a minimum which is compatible with national security and with the enforcement of international obligations by joint actions.

The Council will draw up the plans for disarmament under consideration of the geographical location and the particular conditions of each state and will submit them to the various governments for examination and decision.

Every ten years, these plans are to be subjected to a reexamination and possibly a revision.

The limits of armaments decided upon in such a manner must not be exceeded without the consent of the Council after their acceptance by the various governments.

In consideration of the grave misgivings against the private production of ammunition or military equipment, the members of the League order the Council to devise means to forestall the bad consequences resulting from it, and to do so under consideration of the requirements of the League members who are not in a position to manufacture themselves the quantities of ammunition and military equipment required for their security.

The League members take it upon themselves to furnish each other in the frankest and most exhaustive manner any information about the state of their armaments, their army, navy and aviation programs and the situation of those industries which can be converted for war purposes.

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Part V.

Regulations concerning the Ground, Naval and Air Forces.

In order to render possible a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany agrees to comply strictly with the regulations for the ground, naval and air forces as set forth:

(Article 159)

(From the Peace Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919;
Article 8 and preamble to part V (preceding Article 159)
(Reichsgesetzblatt 1919, p. 687 ff. (723, 919)

I hereby certify, that the above reproduced document is a true copy from the Peace Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919, Article 8 and Preamble to Part V (Reichsgesetzblatt 1919, p. 687 ff. (723, 919).

Nurnberg, 25 February, 1946.

(signed) Dr. Stahmer
(Dr. Otto Stahmer)
Defense Counsel and Notary Public

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Exhibit Goering No 8

From:

2 articles by

Viscount Cecil

in the "Revue de Paris" of

1 March, 1924 and 18 November, 1926

(quoted from: Karl Schilling, "Der Versailler Vertrag und die Abruestung"- "The Treaty of Versailles and the Disarmament"-, Berlin and Bonn, 1933, pp. 61, 62)

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Exhibit Goering Nr. 8

Excerpt from

2 Articles of

Viscount Cecil

in the "Revue de Paris" of 1 March, 1924 and 18 November, 1926. Viscount Cecil, who at the same time was a member of the peace conference has stated twice his opinion on this question in the "Revue de Paris" of 1 March, 1924 and 18 November, 1926. Both times he affirmed that the allied as well as the associated powers are obliged to disarm. In the "Revue de Paris" he states:

"This preamble contains an agreement; it is a solemn promise on the part of the governments to the democracies of all the nations, which have signed the peace treaties."

(From: Karl Schilling "The Treaty of Versailles and the Disarmament", Berlin and Bonn, 1939 pp. 61, 62.)

I herewith certify that the above reproduced document is a true copy from two articles by Viscount Cecil in the "Revue de Paris" of 1 March, 1924 and 18 November, 1926 (quoted from: Karl Schilling: "The Treaty of Versailles and the Disarmament", Berlin and Bonn, 1933, pp. 61, 62.)

Nuernberg, 25. February, 1946.

(sgd.) Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Defense Counsel.

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Exhibit Goering No 9

From the speech of

David Lloyd George

on 7 November, 1927 in London

(quoted from: "Gedanken eines Staatsmannes"- "Thoughts of a Statesman"-, German Edition, Berlin 1929, p.143)

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Exh. Goering Nr.9

From the speech of

David Lloyd George

delivered on 7 November, 1927 in London.

The former British minister President David Lloyd George expressed a similar opinion. In his speech at the Aldwich Club in London on 7 November, 1921 he called the memorandum to the skeleton note of 16 June, 1919 a

> "document which we handed Germany as a solemnpledge on the part of Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and 2o other nations to follow Germany's example after she was disarmed."
>
> (From: "Thoughts of a Statesman", German edition, Berlin, 1929, p.143)

I herewith certify that the above reproduced document is a true copy from the speech of David Lloyd George, delivered on 7 November, 1927 in London (quoted from: "Thoughts of a Statestman", German edition, Berlin, 1929, p.143.)

Nuernberg, 25 February, 1946.

(sgd.) Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Defense Counsel and Notary Public.

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Exhibit Goering No 10

From the speech of

Paul B o n c o u r

on April 8, 1927

at the preperatory Disarmament Commission in charge of preparations.

(quoted from: Karl Schilling, "Der Versailler Vertrag und die Abruestung"- "The Treaty of Versailles and the Disarmament ",- Berlin and Bonn, 1933, p.57)

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Exh. Goering Nr.10

From the speech of

Paul Boncour, delivered at the meeting of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission on 8 April,1927.

Paul Boncour, France's expert on all disarmament questions on 8 April, 1927 at the meeting of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission:

"It is correct that the introduction to part V of the Treaty of Versailles concerns the limitation of armaments, which was imposed on Germany as a prerequisite and as the forerunner of a general limitation of armaments. This brings out very clearly the difference between the armament restrictions of Germany and other similar armament restrictions, which in the course of history have been imposed after the conclusion of wars. This time these regulations, - and in this lies their entire value - have been imposed not only on one of the signatories to the treaty, but they are rather a duty,a moral and 'legal' responsibility for the other signatories to proceed with a general limitation of armaments."

(From: Schilling, "The Treaty of Versailles and the Disarmament", Berlin and Bonn,1933, p.57.)

I herewith certify that the above reproduced document is a true copy from the speech of Paul Boncour, delivered on 8 April,1927 at the meeting of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission (quoted from: Karl Schilling, "The Treaty of Versailles and the Disarmament", Berlin and Bonn 1933, p.57.)

Nuernberg, 25. February,1946.

(sgd.) Dr. Stahmer

(Dr.Otto Stahmer)

Defense Counsel and Notary Public

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Exhibit Goering Nr. 11

From

Lord Rothermere;

"Warnungen und Prophezeiungen"-
"Warnings and prophecies

Z u e r i c h 1939,

pp. 100, 101

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Exhibit Goering Nr. 11

Germany was justified in feeling that she had been betrayed in Versailles. Under the pretext that it would be the first step towards a disarmament of the world she had been disarmed by force. Great Britain, however, had been deceived as well. She actually disarmed for 15 years. But France has from the very day, on which the various peace treaties had been signed, encouraged a lot of small states to rearm vigorously. The result was, that Germany five years after Versailles was encircled by a still stronger ring of iron than she had been five years before the world war.

It was unavoidable, that a German regime repudiating the dictate of Versailles would rearm heavily at the first opportunity. It was clear that its weapons would have to be directed against the Versailles powers, - diplomatically if not in the true sense of the word. With this situation in mind one could only regard the British School of "Disarmament Pacifists" as some sort of suicide club of the people. At least, this is the way I saw it.

(From Rothermere: "Warnings and Prophesies," Zurich 1939, pp. 100, 101.)

I herewith certify that the above reproduced document is a true copy from: Lord Rothermere, "Warnings and Prophesies", Zurich 1939.

Nuernberg, 25. February, 1926.

(sgd.) Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Defense Counsel.

H0668 - 0035

Exhibit Goering Nr. 12

a) From a speech of v. Ribbentrop
before the League of Nations
on 19 March, 1936

(Documente der deutschen Politik,
Band IV, 3. Auflage Berlin 1939,
Seite 119
Documents on German Policy, Volume IV,
Third Edition, Berlin, 1939, page 119)

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b) From the
"Memorandum der Reichsregierung
an die Locarnomaechte"-
Memorandum of the Reich Cabinet to
the Locarno - Powers"- of 25 May, 1935

(quoted from Berber:"Das Diktat of
Versailles" - "The Dictate of Versailles
-Essen, 1939, pages 373,374,375)

H0668 – 0036

a)

Although by the Treaty of Locarno

a guaranty for the protection of the French Eastern border which was later even strengthened by Germany's partidpation in the Kellog-Pact, had been created, France started negotiations with Soviet Russia concerning a military pact of assistance which was absolutely incompatible with the legal situation as created by the Treaty of Locarno. On 2 May, 1936, a France-Soviet Russian pact of assistance was signed and already in a note of 25 May 1935, the German government lodged a protest against the incompatibility of this pact with the Treaty of Locarno.

The wording of this provision shows that before taking an action they wished to base on Article 16 of the Statute of the League of Nations, the two parties to the treaty would first apply to the League of Nations Council, but that they are determined to comply with the obligations to give assistance as agreed upon even in case a recommendation of the Council to this effect or a unanimous Council decision should not be arrived at. This can find no other interpretation than France's claim to the liberty of taking military measures against Germany on the basis of Article 16 of the Statute of the League of Nations in case of a conflict between Germany and the USSR even in the instance where she (France), in doing so, could not refer to a recommendation or a different decision of the League of Nations Council. Evidently, this should apply after Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations even in case an invitation to Germany to be decided upon by the League of Nations Council according to Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Statute, was not arrived at all. In the opinion of the German government such a military action initiated under such circumstances, would be incompatible with Article 16 of the Statute of the League of Nations and therefore represents a flagrant violation of the Rhein Treaty of Locarno.

b)

From von Ribbentrop's speech before the League of Nations on 19 March, 1936.

..... But it is also clear that if a world power (translator's note: the original

H0668-0037

speaks of 'Grossmacht' meaning big power) like France by virtue of her sovereignty can decide upon concluding military alliances of such vast proportions without having misgivings on account of existing treaties, another world power like Germany has at least the right to safeguard the protection of the entire Reich territory by re-establishing within her own borders the natural rights of a sovereign power which are granted all peoples.

Documents of German Policy, page 144

I hereby certify that the above presented document is a true copy from the Memorandum of the Reich Cabinet to the Locarno-Powers of 25 May 1935.

Nuernberg.

25 February 1946.

(signed) Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Attorney at Law and Notary Public.

H0668 – 0038

Read March 22, 1946

Exhibit Goering No 13

From the speech at the Sprtpalast,
Berlin, on 9 April, 1933:

"Nationalismus und Sozialismus"-

"National and Socialism" -

(quoted from Hermann Goering:
"Reden und Aufaetze", -
"Speeches and Articles", -
Munich 1938, pp. 43 ff.)

(Excerpts from this book have already
been submitted by the prosecution
under No PS 3441 and PS 4360)

USA 437

Exhibit Nr. 13

From the speech at the Sportpalast, Berlin, on 9 April 1933. Nationalism and Socialism.

P.43/44

Volksgenossen (compatricts), on the other hand, however, we also want to be generous. We do not wish to practice petty revenge. After all, we are the victors. Therefore, let us be generous, let us realize that we, too, thought differently at one time and then let us be grateful to those who have led us to this glorious geal. And the more we curselves are National Socialists; the stronger and freer we feel ourselves as such, the more generously, the more freely are we able to overlook what belongs to the past and really sincerly extand our hand in reconciliation. On the other hand, however, there where crimes actually were committed against the people just retaliation must take place without pity. For this is the first requisite for being forgiving toward others. The big ones have to be taken care of, not the small ones.

(From: Herrmann Goering: "Reden und Aufsaetze" - "Speeches and Articles"- Munich 1938.)

I hereby certify that the above-presented document is a true copy from the speech at the Sportpalast, Berlin, on 9 April, 1933: "Nationalism and Socialism" (quoted from Hermann Goering: "Reden and Articles"-
Munich, 1938, pages 43 and following).
Nuernberg, 25, February 1946.

(signed) Dr. Stahmer.

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Attorney at Law and Notary Publi

H0668-0039

H0668-0040

Rest March 22, 1946

Exhibit Goering No 14

From the speech:

"Aufbau der deutschen Ostmark" -

"Reconstruction of the German Ostmark"-
at the People's Meeting in Vienna
on 26 March, 1938
(quoted from Hermann Goering:
"Reden und Aufsaetze"-
"Speeches and articles"-
Munich 1938, p. 351, 3 rd para.)

Excerpts from tis book have already
been submitted by the prosecution
under Nos. PS 3441 and PS 3460)

USA 437

H0668 - 0041

Exhibit Goering No 14.

From the speech:

"Aufbau der deutschen Ostmark"

("Reconstruction of the German Ostmark")

at the People's Meeting ("Volkskundgebung") in Vienna on 26 March 1938.

P. 351: (3rd paragraph):

Now I also want to tell you something very serious: I have just emphasized how wonderful was your revolution, or better, how wonderful was your liberation. You were great in suffering and enduring, you were great in standing firmly, you were great in fighting. Now show that you are also great in kindness and especially so toward them my who had been misled.

(Hermann Goering:"Reden und Aufsaetze" -

"Speeches and Articles" -,

Munich, 1938, p. 351, 3rd paragraph.)

I hereby certify that the above presented document is a true copy from the speech "Aufbau der deutschen Ostmark" - "Reconstruction of the German Ostmark" - at the peoples Meeting in Vienna on 26 March, 1938.

Nuernberg,

25 February, 1946.

(signed) Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Attorney-at-Law and Notary Public.

H0668-0042

Read March 22, 1946

Exhibit Goering No 15

From the speech of Hermann Goering:

"Partei und Staat"-
"Party and State"-,
on 26 October, 1935
(quoted from Hermann Goering:
"Reden und Aufsaetze"-
"Speeches and Articles",
Munich 1938, p. 213)

(Excerpts from this book have already been submitted by the prosecution under Nos. PS 3441 and PS 3460).

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H0668 - 0043

Exhibit Goering No 15

From the speech:

"Partei und Staat"

"(Party and State")

at the Silesian Gautag (Gau Rally) on 26 October 1935.

P. 213:

The Church can be sure of one thing: If it will put up with National Socialism, we shall be able calmly to put up with it. Itis up to the Church alone whether it wishes to have peace. We, the Bewegung (translator's note: meant is the National Socialist movement) and above all the government and State have never attacked the Church, we have promised the Church protection and the Church knows that she really possesses this protection today to the fullest extent. Therefore, this is not a matter about which any kind of reproach to us may be made. Bewegung and State want a religious people and, therefore, we do not wish and do not seek a fight with the confessions.

(Hermann Goering: "Reden und Aufsaetze"- "Speeches and Articles"- Munich, 1938)

I hereby certify that the above-presented document is a true copy from the speech "Partei und Staat" - "Party and State" - at the Silesian Gautag on 26 October, 1935 (quoted from Hermann Goering: "Reden und Ausaetze - Speeches and Articles" -, Munich, 1938, p. 213.

(signed) Dr. Stahmer
(Dr. Otto Stahmer)
Attorney-at-Law and Notary Public.

Nuernberg, 25 Februa ry 1946.

H0668-0044

Read March 22, 1946

Exhibit Goering No 16

From the speech:

"Aufbau der deutschen Ostmark"-
"Reconstruction of the German East provinces"-,
at the People's Meeting in Vienna on 26 March, 1938

(Quoted from Hermann Goering:
"Reden und Aufsaetze"-
"Speeches and Articles"-
Munich, 1938, p. 349, 3rd para.)

(Excerpts from this book have already been submitted by the prosecution under Nos. PS 3441 and PS 3460).

USA 437

H0668 -0045

Exhibit Goering No 16

From the speech:

"Aufbau der deutschen Ostmark"

("Reconstruction of the German Ostmark")

at the People's Meeting ("Volkskundgebung") in Vienna on March, 1938.

P. 349:

We do not wish to destroy any Church and we do not wish to abolish any belief or religion. All we want, is to bring about a clear separation. The Church has its definite, very important and very necessary tasks and the State and the "Bewegung" (Translator's note: meaning the National Socialist movement) have other, just as important and just as decisive tasks. If each one sticks strictly to its tasks, nothing will happen. In Germany, we did not prohibit the Catholic Church, in any way, but we did away with the "Zentrumspartei" ("Center Party") and the priests engaging in politics. We have never been against the Church and certainly not against religion, although we National Socialists cannot be looked upon as confessionally bound by a Church.

(Hermann Goering: "Reden und Aufsaetze" -"Speeches and Articles"-, Munich, 1938, p. 349).

I hereby certify that the above-presented document is a true copy from the speech: "Aufbau der deutschen Ostmark" - "Reconstruction of the German East Provinces" - at the People's Meeting in Vienna on 26 March, 1938 (quoted from Hermann Goering: "Reden und Aufsaetze" - "Speeches and Articles" -, Munich, 1938, p. 349).

Nurnberg, 25 February 1946.

(signed) Dr. Stahmer
(Dr. Otto Stahmer)
Attorney-at-Law and Notary Public.

H0668 - 0046

Defts. Ex. No. 5
Filed March 22, 1946

Exhibit Goering No 17

Letter of the Lic.theol. Evangelical Pastor

Werner J e n t s c h

dated 30 October, 1945 to the
General Secretary of IMT.

(Original is in the General Secretary's possession)

Exh. Goering No. 17

Letter of Werner Jentsch Lic. theol. (protestant minister)
dated 30 October 1945

to the Secretary General of the I M T

German Headquarters
Rimini-Miramare, Camp 4
Oct. 30th 1945

Prompted by the proclamation of the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg to give evidence as a witness in connection with the trials of the war criminals I am taking the liberty to inform you about the following:

On July 16, 1945 I made an extensive written declaration on behalf of some members of my previous congregation in Berlin through the proper channels, namely the British chaplain in the 21rst British tank brigade, the Reverend C.E.B. C r a n f i e l d. To honor truth and out of my responsibility as a minister I felt compelled to do so. From September 1939 until April 1943 I was the protestant garrison chaplain for the units of the air forces in Berlin. The declaration concerns the previous Reich-marshal Hermann G o e r i n g and his wife Emmi G o e r i n g, the Oberreichskriegsanwalt (Attorney General of the Armed Forces), Judge of the General Staff Dr. juris Kraell, Mrs. Eva von Schroeder (of the previous Reich management of the N.S.V.) and the ministerial councillor Dr. juris Leonhard B o t t g e r of the ministerial-office of the Reich-marshal.

Knowing as yet only that the declaration has been passed on to the British War Office in London, I want to emphasize again my willingness to testify in court in regard to this declaration, if desired.

signed: Werner Jentsch

D e c l a r a t i o n

Prompted by the announcement over the radio concerning the current trial of the family G o e r i n g, I, the undersigned sergeant (medical corps) Werner Jentsch, at present Protestant garrison chaplain in the German Prisoner of War Hospital Abano Terme (Italy), take the liberty of stating the following to the best of my knowledge and conscience:

From September 1939 until my induction into the armed forces in April 1943, I was part time Protestant post chaplain for the units of the German air Forces in Berlin. My main task in this office was the simple preaching of the Gospel and looking after the spiritual needs of the soldiers. Through this work, I also became acquainted with Mrs. Goering,

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who as the wife of the Reich Marshal belonged to my parish. Although my talks with Mrs. Goering were only of relative importance, certain of her actions and words appear to me so important that I must, to ease my conscience, no longer hesitate to communicate them to the Allied authorities insofar as by doing so the secret of confession will not be violated. It is not the task of a pastor to give a legal opinion. My statements are, therefore, not intended to excuse what cannot be excused, but, rather, they are meant to facilitate a better understanding which, by passing over the facts in silence, might be rendered more difficult.

Mrs. Goering has many times shown the fullest understanding for the cause of Christianity and has, as far as was in her power, courageously and emphatically used her influence for that cause in an environment which fought it widely or at least displayed a critical attitude toward it. May I among other facts point out the following:

1. At a time when most government and party offices would no longer receive representatives of the churches, she had the courage to grant me, as a clergyman, permission on three occasions to report on serious troubles and needs of the church. I was allowed to speak frankly - for instance on the subjects of total prohibition of printing Christian books and of the increasing de-Christianization of the radio. In the same friendly manner she replied to several of my written requests or passed them on with a word of recommendation.

2. For years no representatives of either the protestant or the catholic church had been received by Adolf Hitler and the leading Reich Ministers; she interceded personally with the Reich Marshal on behalf of protestant priests for a reception.

3. At the outbreak of war Mrs. Goering tried to effect the establishment of Christian soldiers' homes which the Protestant association of Young Men (Jungmaennerwerk) of Germany wanted to build, as was done in the last world war.

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4. She was prepared to recommend to Herman Goering a detailed memorandum about the establishment of a fulltime Protestant and Catholic chaplain's office in all Air Force Hospitals at the front and at home. She definitely had a motherly heart which did not think of material things only but always of the spiritual welfare of her husband's soldiers.

5. She intervened through her husband on behalf of a man who refused to do military service for religious reasons and was therefore sentenced to death.

6. By her cooperation was made possible the liberation from a concentration camp of both sons of two confessional ministers from Stettin (D. Rendtorff and P. Reichmuth).

7. Every Easter Frau Goering had about 75 photographs of herself, her husband and her child, with her own and her husband's personal signatures, distributed to my candidates for confirmation (children of soldiers and officers of the Luftwaffe in Berlin) and had best wishes for their confirmation expressed to them. It should be noted that exactly in these years confirmation was strongly combatted by the Party and the Hitler Jugend, and the so-called "pledge of Youth" took place every Easter already then as a sort of political substitute - in the National Socialist sense - for confirmation. The Christian community accepted this recognition by the Reichmarshal's wife with thankful satisfaction.

8. I should not like to pass over without mentioning that she once told me in the course of a private conversation that she wished above all a church consecration of her marriage and the Christian baptism of her daughter.

Herman Goering himself had an answer given to me through his chief adjudant relative to a petition on behalf of the introduction of an official spiritual service especially for the Luftwaffe, that he could not at the moment do anything because Adolf Hitler had not yet made

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a final decision concerning the religious question. However, he wished full freedom of religion in the Luftwaffe, including the Christian denominations, and every member of the Luftwaffe could choose for himself whichever chaplain or civilian pastor he desired.

During the whole transactions which I had to carry on officially and in a spiritual capacity with the Goering family and the Ministry of the Reichsmarshal, Ministerialrat Dr. Leonhard B o t t g e r of the ministry office constantly rendered great service in behalf of the Christian faith, insofar as he at all times, within the sphere of his capacities, handled the messages and letters and personally helped so energetically as to risk his position. Thereby he never hesitated to commit himself publicly to his evangelic Christianity.

To avoid misunderstandings I inform you that I had nothing to do with the former German-Christian Reich Bishop Mueller, who played a passing role in the Goering household during the first years of the Third Reich. I emphasize expressly that I make my above statements even though I was exiled from Danzig in 1937 as a result of my taking part in a religious service of intercession on behalf of Pastor Niemoeller and through my activity for the Evangelic Young Men's Association (German designation of YMCA).

I make this declaration alone for the sake of veracity and out of a feeling of spiritual responsibility.

Albano Terme, 25 June 1945

Signed: Werner Jentsch.

I hereby certify that the above reproduced document is a true copy of the letter of Lic. Thol. Werner Jentsch to the Secretary General of the IMT.

Nuernberg, 25 February 1946

signed: Dr. Stahmer
(Dr. Otto Stahmer)
Attorney and notary public.

H0668-0051

Exhibit Goering Nr. 18

From the radio speech of Hermann Goering:
"Der Kampf gegen die Vivisektion"-
"The Fight against the Vivisection"-
on 28 August, 1933

(Quoted from Hermann Goering:
"Reden und Aufsaetze"-
"Speeches and Articles"-
Munich 1938, pp. 82, 83

(Excerpts from this book have already been submitted by the prosecution under Nor. PS 3441 and PS 3460).

H0668-0052

Exhibit Goering No 18

From the Radio Address

"Fight against Vivisection"

on 28 August, 1933

Page 82/83

That only very few scientists and here again mostly those of a people alien to us, have had their feelings, [illegible] dulled or entirely lacking is proved by examples of scientific literature of past times, in which, without any trace of human compassion, tortures of the worst kind without anaestetics through operations without anaesthetics, through burning, freezing, starvation and similar acts are described.

(From: Hermann Goering
"Speeches and Essays", Munich 1938)

I hereby certify that the above-reproduced document is a true copy from the radio address "Fight against Vivisection" of 28 August, 1933 (quoted from Hermann Goering: "Speeches and Essays", Munich 1938, Page 82/83)

Nuernberg, 25 February, 1946

signed: Dr. Stahmer
(Dr. Otto Stahmer)
Attorney-at-Law and Notary Public.

H0668-0053

Exhibit Goering No 19

Goering's speech before the Gauleiter in Berlin
in November or December 1938

(reported by Gauleiter Uiberreither)

H0668-0054

Exhibit Goering No. 19

Goering's Speech to the Gauleiters in Berlin

a few weeks after 9 November 1938

H. G. called the Gauleiters a few weeks after 9 November, 1938 to Berlin and in a temperamental manner strongly condemned the occurrences a) because of the occurrences in themselves b) because of their effect upon the world public. The Reich had other possibilities of reacting to the kind of attack the murder of the ambassador represents. Wild individual actions should never be allowed. What has happened did not correspond to the dignity of the Reich. He granted that, with few exceptions, the Gauleiters did not participate and to a large part were not in their districts during the period in question, but he pointed out expressly that it was the duty of the Gauleiters to use their whole influence so that similar occurrences would not be repeated.

Signed: Uiberreither

I hereby certify, that the above-reproduced document is a true copy of a letter which the former Gauleiter Uiberreither has addressed to me on 21 February 1946.

Nuernberg, 22 February, 1946

Signed: Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Attorney-at-Law and Notary Public.

H0668-0055

Exhibit Goering No 20

Reich Marshall Hermann Goering's speech
in the summer of 1938
before the Gauleiter in Karinhall

(reported by former Gauleiter Uiberreither

H0668-0056

Exhibit Goering No. 20

Speech of Reich Marshall H. Goering in Summer 1938

to the Gauleiters (district leaders) in Karinhall

Basis for Four-Years Plan presented particularly for the benefit of the 7 new Gauleiters of Austria. Necessities for armament result from the reintroduction of compulsory military service and the increase in the number of soldiers connected with it. Boundless propaganda abroad, in the East and in the West, against the Reich, is forcing Germany to become stronger and to aspire to its independence from foreign countries. The stronger the Reich is economically and militarily the smaller the danger that it will be attacked. War must be prevented by all means. The present generation is still suffering from a lost world war. "The start of a war would cause a shock among the German people". The war generation, which was young during the world war of 1914-18 has become old in the meantime. Lenghty, detailed explanations why older people cling more to life than young people. The speaker expressed his doubts that even a war against France could be ended successfully on our part, apart from the fact that - due to the general propaganda against Germany, orally and in print, - the circle of the enemies would be rather close. Goering repeatedly expressed his conviction that it was in the interest of Germany and Europe that the English empire remain in existence. He hoped that it would be possible to secure for the German people without war the position in Europe due it, and he pointed out that we will have to pursue a policy which under no circumstances must lead to war. The Four-Years-Plan

H0668-0057

would require much work and deprivations, however, it would bring the results - without war - that Germany would again be a factor in the European policy.

signed: Uiberreither

I herewith certify the above reproduced documents is a true copy of a letter which the former Gauleiter Uiberreither has addressed to me on 21 February, 1946

Nuernberg, 22 February 1946

signed: Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Attorney and Notary Public.

H0668-0058

[redacted] Read March 22, 1946

Exhibit Goering No 21

From General Fieldmarshall Goering's
telephone conversation
with Ambassador von Ribbentrop

London - Berlin
on 13 March 1938

This document was already submitted by the prosecution under No. 2949-PS. USA 76

H0668-0059

Exhibit Goering No 21

Field Marshal Goering with Reich Foreign Minister v. Ribbentrop

11 March, 38 London 9:15 - 9:55 (telephone conversation)

.....

Now I want to say one thing; if it is said here that we have overpowered the independence of the Austrian people under pressure, it could only be said that one thing was put under pressure, but not from our side, and that is the infinitely small government. The Austrian people is only now free. I would simply suggest to Halifax or to a few really important people whom he trusts, that he just send them over here so they can look the situation over. They should travel through the country, then they can see everything.

.....

Which state in the whole world will be harmed by our union? Are we taking something from any state? If the states say: yes, against our interests: what interests did the states have? Then they could only have had the interest to make Austria an enemy of Germany. In all of Austria there is not 0.1% minority. All people are German, all people speak German. Thus there is not a single state involved. And the states which might be the only ones to be interested, you may say, Italy and Yugoslavia and Hungary, as they have a German population of several hundredthousand, and who eventually might say, well through that we feel ... etc., do not consider themselves endangered.

.....

that the German troops on their march through Austria always have to stay 15 to 20 km from the border and that north of the Danube in the whole space there is only one dissolved battalion marching, so that these villages also may enjoy the jubilation and the joy. After all, today the marching no longer proceeds according to military principles, but on all highways smaller columns are marching because every village wants to see a German soldier.

H0668-0060

.....

We too realize now that a marching in is no longer necessary. The whole matter takes place now as such a matter must take place it is now only a jubilation march; if you want to call it so , as soon as it is over, which must be to-morrow or the day after to-morrow, the withdrawal of the troops will start. And then,- as the Austrian Government has informed us - they would hold free and secret elections according to all democratic principles, where every Austrian will be able to cast a really free vote. For this they intend to ask for people from abroad so that they could not be blamed afterwards of having falsified the results - as Schuschnigg had done - and so they can see that this election is really secret. After all,it is also in our interest because we are solemnly convinced that we will get an overwhelming majority. Therefore, it is also in our interest that the election be held absolutely correctly. Only after the election has taken place will we see what the people have decided and what will happen. You must not let any doubt open in one respect: We respect in every sense Austria's decision. And if it decides on union, of which we can have no doubt, no power in the world will succeed in deviding us again. It is possible that a world alliance of all states will conquer Germany, but it is impossible that we will allow them to separate us again, once Austria has decided to merge with Germany.

.....

H0668-0061

Exh. Goering Nr. 21

I certify herewith that the above reproduced document is a true copy of the telephone conversation between Fieldmarshal Goering and the Ambassador von Ribbentrop London - Berlin on March, 13th 1938.

Nuernberg, February 25, 1946.

(Dr. Otto Stahmer

Attorney and Notary Public

Defs. Ex. No. 83
Filed March 22, 1946

H0668-0062

Exhibit Goering No 22.

Questionaire
of Hermann Goering's Defense
Counsel
to the Earl of Halifax
dated 1 February, 1946

H0668-0063

Answers to the questionnaire which the counsel for the defendant Hermann Goering submitted in the present legal proceedings before the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg; of the Right Honourable Earl of Halifax, His Majesty 's ambassador in Washinton, D.C.

---

1) in November 1937, did you and Ambassador Henderson visit the defendant Goering in Karinhall and were you his guest there?

A. Yes.

2) At this occasion did a conversation take place concerning the political situation ?

A. Yes.

3) At this conversation did Goering tell you:
Any German government would consider the following questions:
a) the Anschluss of Austria and the Sudetenland to Germany,
b) the return of Danzig to Germany with a reasonable solution of the Corridor question,
as an integral part of its policy ?

A. Yes.

4) Did you reply to that:
but I trust, without a war ?

A. I said that His Majesty's government desires the peaceful solution of the questions pertaining to Germany and its neighbors. Otherwise I did not discuss these questions.

5) Has Goering replied to that:
That depends very much on Britain. England could contribute much to the peaceful solution of this question.
Goering does not want a war on account of that matter,but these questions must be solved under all circumstances.

A. Yes.

6) Did the Swedish civ. Engineer Birger Dahlerus of Stockholm repeatedly visit you in August 1935 in agreement with the defendant Goering ?

A. Yes.

7) Did you know that by that Goering wanted to establish a direct contact with you and the Prime Minister, respectively, evading thereby the German Foreign Office ?

A. I have no such knowledge outside of the fact that Dahlerus said so.

H0668-0064

8) Did you know that this direct contact with you was to be arranged to bring about a peaceful solution of the Polish-German crisis?

A. I have no such knowledge, outside of the fact that Dahlerus said so.

9) Did you know that Goering wanted to use his influence with Hitler for such a peaceful solution?

A. I have no such knowledge, outside of the fact that Dahlerus said so.

10) Did Dahlerus at that time (August 1939) appear more frequently at your or your associates'place?

A. Yes.

11) What was the content of the discussion you and/or your associates had with Dahlerus?

A. The discussions concerned themselves with the grave threat against European peace resulting from the German demands on Poland.

12) What were the proposals you transmitted to Goering through Dahlerus?

A. The opinions of His Majesty's government concerning the situation arising from the German demands on Poland were stated in terms similar to those sent by His Majesty's government to Hitler, and which were later made public by His Majesty's government.

13) Were there written records made of the discussions with Dahlerus and of the proposals sent to Goering?

A. Normally, short reports are made of all discussions with the Secretary of State or with the members of the Staff of the Foreign Office. No other report or any special reports were made of the discussions with Dahlerus.

14) Where are these reports?

A. All reports as stated in the first sentence of the answer to question 13 are kept in the archives of the Foreign Office.

15) Did you get the impression that Goering's efforts to prevent a war were sincere?

A. I have no doubt that Goering would have preferred it, if he could have done it.

16) Did your Ambassador Henderson tell you that Goering, - after the official discussion between Henderson and Ribbentrop in August 1939, at which Ribbentrop had only read the German demands on Poland to the Ambassador Henderson, but had not handed them to him, - invited him and

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disclosed to him, the Ambassador Henderson, in private the contents of the memorandum which had been read, as Goering was not sure whether Henderson comprehended the terms read to him by Ribbentrop?

A. Yes.

17) Did Henderson tell you or did you find out by any other means that Goering pointed out at this occasion that he was not entitled to make such a communication and was doing it on his own responsibility in order to endeavour still to help relieve the strained relations?

A. Sir Nevile Henderson did not tell me that. I have no knowledge of it.

18) Did not the Ambassador Henderson tell you in general that Goering was making an effort to avert the outbreak of a war?

A. No.

19) Was it reported to you that Goering always, at every opportunity spoke up for a German-English understanding?

A. No.

20) Would you not rather appear before the International Military Tribunal to testify as a witness in preference to answering these questions in writing?

A. No.

sign. Halifax

I, Hubert Norman Puller, His Majesty's Consul in Washington, certify herewith that the signature Halifax, is the signature of the Earl of Halifax, His Majesty's ambassador in Washington, D.C.

Submitted on the 1st day of Feb. 1946
at His Majesty's Consulate
Washington, D.C.
sign. H.N. Puller
H.B.M. Consul

Stamp: British Consulate Washington, Feb. 1. 1946
Certified in the Foreign Office to acknowledge the above signature
H.N. Puller

Stamp: Foreign Office, London
14. Feb. 1946

sig. David Scott
For the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

To verify correctness of translation from the English original

Werner Bross,
Assistant Judge.

I certify herewith that the above reproduced document is a correct translation of the questionnaire.

(signed)
Dr. Otto Stahmer
Attorney-at-Law and Notary Public.

Nuremberg,
23 Feb., 1946.

Defts. Exhibit No. # 2

Filed March 22, 1946

Exhibit Goering No 23

From the book by
Sir Nevile Henderson
"Failure of a Mission"

L o n d o n 1940

(pp. 70, 83, 275 and 274).

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H0668-0067

P. 70.

In comparison he (Goering) suffered little from the personal sensibility that so often motivated Hitler and Ribbentrop, and until the last I was inclined to believe in the sincerity of his personal desire for peace and for a good relationship with England.

P. 83.

I should like to give expression here to my belief that the Field-marshall, had it been up to him, would not have gambled at the price of war, as did Hitler in 1939. As will be mentioned later, he stood decidedly on the side of peace in September 1938. They say, he has lost much of Hitler's favor on account of that, and it is possible that he would have played the same part in 1939, were it not for his attempts in 1938. The first time it was an experience, but the second time it might have been considered a failure by the Fuehrer, and unfortunately, it was a part of the Greek tragedy, that Goering had 1938 behind him, and which he could not repeat. He was the perfect servant of his master, and I have not seen any greater faithfulness and devotion than was his to Hitler. Admittedly, he was the second man in the country, and he always gave me to understand that he was the natural successor to Hitler, as Fuehrer. Men in secondary places are often inclined to emphasize their own importance. In all the frank discussions that I had with Goering, he never spoke of himself or of the great part he played in the Nazi revolution: Everything had been done by Hitler, all the confidence he had, was confidence in Hitler, every decision was Hitler's, and he, himself, was nothing. Considering the fact that the enumeration of the positions Goering filled in the

H0668-0068

five minutes time, this self renunciation before his Fuehrer was the more remarkable, particularly, since Hitler would have never gotten where he was without Goering. Hitler's brain might have conceived the impossible, but it was Goering who carried it out. The building up of the German airforce in itself was a surprising success, and one of which Goering most likely, and rightly so, was proudest. No matter how conceited he might have been in little things, and as much as he loved pomp, uniforms, medals, jewels and paintings and the acclaim of his companions, - he did not brag about the big things which he had accomplished.

P.273

I saw the Polish ambassador at 2 a.m. (on August 31, 1939) and gave him an objective, moderate report of my conference with Ribbentrop, I mentioned the cession of Danzig and the plebiscite in the Corridor, as the two main points of the German proposals, observed that on the whole, so far as I could see, they were not as a whole too unreasonable , and suggested to him to advise his government immediately to propose a meeting between Fieldmarshall Rydz-Smigly and Goering. I felt obligated to add that I could hardly believe in the success of negotiations if they were to be held with Ribbentrop. Although Lipski undertook to propose this to his government, at that time it would have been too late anyway.

P. 274.

During the entire day there was much activity on the part of Goering. I believe that Goering himself would have preferred a peaceful solution, however, in such matters only Hitler's

H0668-0069

decision counted, and, whatever Goering felt, he was only the faithful and devoted servant of his master. Also, a year ago, he was decidedly for the peace, as already mentioned before, and it might have been hard for him to steer this course a second time. He invited me, nevertheless, to see him that afternoon; this I did at 5 o'clock escorted by Sir Ogilvie Forbes. Since I heard that the text of the proposals which Ribbentrop did not want to give me, was to be read on a broadcast; my first remark was to make it clear to the fieldmarshall that this action will surely and finally lead the last chance for peace, to failure and to do his utmost to prevent the broadcast. Goering replied that he could not intervene and that the German government felt itself obligated to announce its proposals to the world by radio, to prove its "good faith".

Instead, he spoke about two hours on the unfairness of the Poles and of Hitler's and his won desire for friendship with England, and of the advantage that the world in general, and England in particular, could gain from such friendship. It was a meeting that lead nowhere, and I had the feeling that these remarks, that from his point of view were quite natural, but which I had already heard so often, were mainly made for the edification of the audience. I deduced the worst from the fact that he was able to give so much of his time to me at a moment like this. Several days previously he had been appointed President of the new Reichs-Defense-Council (or War-Cabinet) and could have hardly afforded to spend so much time in conversation, had he not been of the opinion that everything, down to the last detail, was ready for the commitment.

H0668-0070

Incidentally , the composition of this council proved Hitler's craftiness. He selected the most distinguished of the Nazi leaders, like Dr. Frick, Dr. Lammers, Dr. Funk, on whom he could count, besides Fieldmarshal Goering, the most popular of them all with the public, in order, to win the confidence of the German population. In this he passed over the worst extremists and the most unpopular ones. To the latter was assigned the less enviable task to handle the neutrals, to organize the interior and to oppress ruthlessly discontent in the interior.

Indeed, my total impression of this last meeting with Goering was that it has been a last but fruitless endeavor to separate Great Britain from the Poles. Nevertheless, the Fieldmarshal seemed serious, as he returned from a call to the phone to inform us that Mr. Lipski was on his way to visit Ribbentrop. He seemed relieved and hopeful that in spite of everything the war could be averted, provided that a contact could still be established.

I certify herewith that the document reproduced above is a true excerpt taken from the book by Sir Nevile Henderson "Failure of a Mission" London, 1940.

Nuernberg, 25 February 1946.

(sign.) Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Attorney and Notary Public

H0668-0071

Exhibit Goering No 24

From the
note of the German Foreign Office
to the Government of the USSR dated
21 June, 1941

(Quoted from "Dokumente deutscher
Politik"- "Documents of German Policy"-,
volume 8, part I,
Berlin 1943, pp. 402-407)

H0668-0072

Excerpt from the Note of the German Foreign Office to the Government of the USSR, dated June 21, 1941.

In reality, however, as was shown in the course of events, the Soviet-union's policy at that time was directed to one goal exclusively, namely to insert Moscow's military power into the space between the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea everywhere, where it seemed possible to her to push forward toward the West and to carry its bolshevisation further into Europe.

The development of this policy is marked by the following stages:

1. The development started with the signing of the so-called assistance pact with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in October and November 1939 (September 28, October 5 and 10,1939) and with the building of bases in these countries.

2. The next Sovietrussian step was directed towards Finland. When the Soviet-Russian demands, the acceptance of which would have eliminated the free Finnish state, had been rejected by the Finnish government, the Soviet Government caused the formation of the Communistic pseudogovernment of Kuusinen, and when the Finnish people refused any contact with this government, the ultimatum to Finland (26 Nov.,1939) and at the end of Nov.1939 the invasion by the Red Army followed. In the Finnish-Russian peacepact of March (March 12, 1940) Finland had to cede a part of its southwestern provinces, which immediately became subject to Bolshevism.

3. A few months later, that is in July 1940, the Sovietunion acted against the Baltic states. Lithuania, after the first Moscow treaty (23 August, 1939), had belonged to the German sphere of interest.

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In the second agreement (of 28 September 1939) the Reich Government renounced its interests in the major part of this country, if only reluctantly, to comply with the wishes of the Soviet-Union, for the sake of the dear peace in favor of the Soviet-Union, while a small portion of the country still remained within the sphere of German interests. Following an ultimatum of 15 June all of Lithuania, i.e. also that part of Lithuania that remained in the sphere of German interests was occupied by the Soviet-Union without in any way informing the Reich Government, so that the USSR now directly approached the entire border of East-Prussia. Later, when Germany was approached on this subject and after difficult negotiations, the Reich Government also ceded this part of Lithuania to the Soviet-Union in order to take another step towards a friendly solution.

A short time later (on 17 June 1940) and in the same manner, Latvia and Esthonia were also militarily occupied in violation of mutual assistance pacts concluded with these countries. Contrary to specific assurances by Moscow all the Baltic countries were now sovietized and a few weeks after the occupation (on 3,5 and 6 August 1940 by decisions of the Surpreme Soviets) were simply annexed by the Soviet Government. Simultaneously with the annexaction the first powerful mass formations of the Red Army took place in the entire northern sector of the Soviet-Russian position of power against Europe.

It may be mentioned here, in passing, that the economic agreements between Germany and these countries which were not to be affected by the Moscow agreements, were unilaterally cancelled by the Soviet Government.

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4. The agreements of Moscow demarcating the interests in the former Polish territory clearly stated that no political agitation was to take place beyond the demarcation of interests but that the activity of both authorities of occupation was to be confined exclusively to the peaceful development of these territories. The Reich Government has irrefutable proof after the occupation of this territory that, in spite of these agreements, the Soviet-Union did not only tolerate inimical agitation against Germany, in the Government General of Poland but supported it concurrently with a bolshevistic propaganda. Strong Russian garrisons were also placed in these territories in the Gouvernement. immediately following the occupation.

5. While the German army was still fighting in the West against France and England, the Soviet Union moved against the Balkans. The Soviet Government had declared at the Moscow conference that it would never make advances of its own towards a solution of the question of Bessarabia and on 24 June 1940 the Reich Government received a communication from the Soviet Government that it was now determined to solve the question of Bessarabia by force It was informed simultaneously that the Soviet claim also extended to Bukowina, a territory formerly crownland of Austria that had never belonged to Russia and that was never mentioned at the time of the Moscow conferences The German ambassador in Moscow (Graf von der Schulenburg) explainedd to the Soviet Government that its decision came as a surprise to the Reich Government and that it would result in a strong injury to German economic interest in Rumania and in the disturbance of the lives of the numerous German settlers there as well as of those in Bukowina.

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However, Mr. Molotov replied that the matter was very urgent and that the Soviet Union expected to be informed within 24 hrs. of the attitude of the Reich Government to this question. In spite of this brusque procedure against Rumania, the Reich Government interceded again in favor of the Soviet-Union in order to maintain peace and to preserve her frienship. It counseled the Rumanian Government that had asked for the assistance of Germany to accede and recommended the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukowina to the Soviet-Union. Along with the answer of consent of the Rumanian Government (of 27 June 1940) Germany submitted to the Soviet Government the plea of the Rumanian Government to be granted sufficient time to evacuate these extensive territories and to guarantee the lives and possession of their inhabitants. However, the Soviet-Union presented another ultimatum to Rumania (on 27 June 1940) and, prior to its expiration, began on 28 June to occupy parts of Bukowina and subsequently all of Bessarabia as far as the Danube. These territories were also annexed immediately by the Soviet Union (by decree of the Supreme Soviets of 2 August 1940) and were sovietized and thereby actually ruined.

By the occupation and sovietizing of the entire sphere of interests ceded by the German Government to the USSR in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the Soviet Government has clearly and unequivocally violated the Moscow agreements. Yet the German Government still adopted a more than loyal attitude towards the USSR. It restrained itself completely in the war with Finland (compare the German communique of 7 December 1939; Document vol. 7, page 173, F. ann. I) and in the Baltic question; in the Bessarabian question it supported the attitude of the Soviet Government towards the Rumanian Government

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and bore with the situations created by the Soviet Government even though it was hard to do so. But beyond that and in order to avoid all possible divergences between the two countries in advance, it undertook a large scale action of resettlement (compare Document vol. 7, doc. 126 and pages 624 - 639) by which it returned all German nationals from the territories occupied by the USSR to Germany. The Reich Government is of the opinion that bette proof for its wishes to achieve a lasting peace with the USSR could hardly be offered.

(Doc. D. Pol. Vol. 8, part I,
Berlin 1943, pp.402-405)

The following demands were made by Mr. Molotov in Berlin and during the subsequent diplomatic discussions with the German ambassador in Moscow:

1.) It is the desire of the Soviet-Union to give a guarantee to Bulgaria and in addition to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with that country, similar to the pacts concluded with the Baltic States i.e. including military bases while Mr. Molotov declared that the internal regime of Bulgaria would not be affected.

2.) The Soviet Union demands an agreement with Turkey for the purpose of creating a base for the land- and sea-forces of the USSR on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles based on a long-term lease. In case Turkey should not accede to this, then Germany and Italy were to join in the Russian diplomatic measures for enforcement of this demand.

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3.) The Soviet Union declares that it again feels itself threatened by Finland and therefore demands complete abandonment of Finland by Germany. It is understood that Germany could not accept these Russion demands which were designated as a prerequisite by the Soviet Government for joining in the Three-Power-Part.

(Doc. D. Pol. Vol. 8, part I,
Berlin 1948, page 4o7.)

I certify that the above reproduced document is a copy taken from the note of the German Foreign Office to the Government of the USSR. of 26.6.1941. (Cited according to doc. D Pol. vol. 8, part I, Berlin 1948, pp. 4o2-4o7.)

Nuernberg, 22 February, 1946.

signed: Dr. Stahmer
(Dr. Otto Stahmer)
Attorney at Law and Notary Public.

H0668-0078

Exhibit Goering No 25

Document 1743 PS

Here is to add:
Document 1743 PS.
("Green Folder").

H0668-0079

The Reichsmarschall

of the Greater German Reich

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.1743-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1000 Copies
33

Top Secret

Directives

for Economic Policy

(Green Portfolio)

Part I

Missions and Organization

of Economy

Berlin, June 1941

H0668-0080

Economic-Policy Staff East

Top Secret.

Note: Up until X day these orders will be treated as "top secret (top secret)", as of X day openly as "restricted".

Directives for the Economic Policy in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories

(Green Portfolio)

Part I

Missions and Organization of the Economy

BERLIN, June 1941

printed by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

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Preliminary Remarks.

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The "Green Portfolio", part I, serves the troop command and the economic agencies for orientation about the economic missions in the new territories to be occupied in the East. It contains directives about the supply of the troops from the land and gives directives to the troops for the support of the economy.

The orders and directives, contained in the "Green Portfolio" correspond to the military orders, issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) and by the branches of the Armed Forces.

The Main Economic Tasks.

The explanations below are first contemplated as orientation for the period of operations. However they contain at the same time the directives, which serve as the first basis for the entire time of the occupation. The economic orders, necessary in the further course of the occupation, will be issued, as soon as the big political goals will be made known which will be determined in the connection with the necessary improvement of the German war economy.

I. According to the orders issued by the Fuehrer, all measures are to be taken which are necessary in order to bring about the immediate and highest possible exploitation of the occupied territories. On the other hand, all measures are to be refrained from and postponed which could endanger this goal.

II. The exploitation of the new territories to be occupied has to be executed primarily in the fields of the food and mineral oil economy. The main economic goal of the action is to gain as much food and mineral oil as possible for Germany. Besides that, other raw materials must be procured for the German war economy from the occupied territories in so far as this can be executed technically and is possible in view of the production which must be maintained out there. Whatever concerns the type and extent of the manufacturing production, to be retained in the occupied territories, to be restored or to be newly organized, is to be decided upon

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primarily according to the demands which the exploitation of the agriculture and mineral oil industry presents for the German war economy.

Accordingly, clearly defined emphatic points result for the economic leadership of the occupied territories. This applies in regard to the main goals as well as to the individual and auxiliary missions, serving for the former's execution. This results further that those missions, which cannot be united with the basis goals and/or would render their maintenance more difficult, must be disregarded even if the work on them could be ever so desirable. The contention, that the main thing is that the occupied territories must be brought back to order and reconstructed as soon as possible, is completely wrong. On the contrary, the treatment of the various parts of the country will have to be very different from each other. Only those areas, in which important food and mineral oil reserves can be exploited for us, will have to be advanced by us economically and primarily be brought back to order. In other parts of the country, which cannot feed themselves - such as large parts of Northern and Central Russia - the economic leadership must limit itself to the utilization of the available supplies.

It will be reserved for later decisions, which armament factories will be retained or reconstructed.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1743-PS
(CONT'D)

III. For the individual fields the following applies:

a) Nutrition and Farming:

1) In order to relieve Europe's food situation and to unburden the traffic highways, the first assignment will as soon as possible provide the food for the German troops from the occupied territory exclusively. The entire requirement of oats for the Armed forces, in so far as it cannot be procured from other occupied territories will be covered from Central Russia, the main territory for the cultivation of oats. In South Russia we will strive to use barby and corn for fodder in place of oats.

2) In the collection of foodstuffs for domestic economy, special emphasis will be placed on oil bearing seeds and grain. The accumulated harvest surplus and the stock in the Southern territory will be secured with all means, the orderly course of the harvest labors will be supervised, the influx into the agricultural districts surplus areas of Middle and North Russia will be ruthlessly stopped, as long as no exceptions are made or are caused by the feeding of troops.

b) For the industrial raw materials the greatest emphasis is placed on the mineral oils. Among the projects which do not serve the nutritional economy, the tasks which are related to the production and the shipment of mineral oil have priority under any circumstances. The continental Oil Co.Inc. will be established for the execution of the measures to be taken in the mineral oil field, especially in the CAUCASUS.

Supplying the farming industry with motor fuel for tractors will be a special task. On it will depend the harvest and the fall results. Until its completion, the transport within the new territory will therefore have priority over shipments to Germany.

c) The industries, which in the interests of Germany build the requisites for the functioning of the agricultural production carried out in the surplus territory, the production of mineral oil and the delivery of

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raw materials, will be favored and set quickly into motion. It is to be decided later about the activation of industries for consumer goods for the supply of the Southern area especially.

d) Special emphasis is to be placed on the following for the transportation performances, which are for the German interest:

1) Highway construction in the Southern area, and the transit routes,

2) extension of the railroads, especially by creation of two track roads in the most important traffic areas.

3) improvements on canals and change-over installations in the inland waterways, especially in the North and South traffic.

4) Reconstruction of the port installations.

For that the Armed Forces transportation authorities will instigate that which is necessary. As long as no military orders are given in this field, the construction work is to be kept within the framework of the directives. The recruiting of manual labor must not endanger the harvest and cultivation tasks. Workers are to be taken from the city or from industrial workers.

e) The following applies to the remaining industrial production:

1) The exploitation of the other industrial capacities including the armament industry will only then be used if the prevailing main missions are not retarded in any way.

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(Page 5 of orig.) 2. Within the frame of this industrial assignment, the utilization of the armament industry has priority.

3. In the agricultural surplus regions of North and Central-Russia, through the wandering off of workers to the country, an industrial decrease in production will be taken into the bargain.

4. Factories which at first have to remain at a standstill in territories showing agricultural surplus products, will be kept under maintenance.

f) Those who become unemployed in the industrial towns, and do not emigrate to farms, are to be inducted immediately if possible, within an organization for the reconstruction and improvement of communications-lines important for the German War-economy, to be created for this purpose, or to deploy them in some other field, also serving German ineresta.

IV. To insure economic results in the German interest, the servies of leading men in the Economy-Commissaries (Wirtschaftskommissariaten) in the Main Administrative Office and in other administrative offices, as well as services of leaders in agricultural and industrial establishments (but not political functionaries) should be made use of as much as possible. Their future role will be determined later on. The decisive factor at present is the leadership and functioning of the management apparatus led by as small a utilization of German manpower as possible.

V. Regarding the size of the territory to be exploited, the insecurity of the known basic facts, and the inaccurate knowledge of the economic conditions after occupation, it is impossible to issue directives, at this time, covering every detail. The action to be taken in individual instances depends mostly on further developments but especially on the results of military operations. In case of emergency the management posts shall be charged with issuing the necessary regulations and the proper reports thereof.

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The Economic Organization.

A. In General.

For uniformity in leadership of the Economic administration in the Zone of Operation and in the political administrational districts to be created later, the Reichsmarschall established the "Economic Policy Staff East" ("Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost") directly subordinate to him, and led - in his absence - by State Secretary Koerner.

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For the representation of the military interests, for the preparation and for the duration of the military operations, the Chief of the War Economy and Armament Office, General of the Infantry Thomas, has the authority which he exercises as a member of the Economy Policy Staff East (Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost).

The directives of the Reich Marshal include all phases of the Economy including food and agriculture. They will be carried out by the subordinate economic agencies (see B).

The orders of the "Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost" will be transmitted by the Chief of the Wi Rue office to the advanced "Wirtschaftsstab Ost" in the occupied territory which will be located during the operations in the immediate vicinity of the OKH/Gen Qu.

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B. Organization of the Economy in the zone of operations.

I. The subordinate economic agencies of the "Wirtschaftstab Ost" are, as far as they are active in the zone of operation assigned to the Command agencies of the Army and militarily under their jurisdiction, namely:

a) In the rear area of the army:

one each economic inspection team with the Commanders of the army rear area,

one each or several economic commands with the security divisions,

one group IV Wi each with the field administration headquarters.

b) In the Army zone:

one each IV Wi (= B.O. Wi Rue Office) with the AOK's (Army high commands)

one each group IV Wi with the field administration headquarters which have advanced into the Army zone and which are under the jurisdiction of the AOK's, also as necessary, economic commands militarily under the jurisdiction of the AOK's advanced into the Army zone.

.....

Page 9

C. Organization of the Economy for the political administration districts.

Regulation will follow later by the Reich Marshal.

Execution of the Individual
Economic Tasks.

1. Within the food economy, the procurement of grain and oleaginous plants is the foremost task. All measures for this will be taken with a long-range view (bringing in of the harvest, safe storage, preparation and cultivication of the fields for autumn, making available manpower and machines, seed, fertilizer, throttling of the consumption of the native population. As much use as possible is to be made of the establishment of simple community kitchens.)

Page 14

The Supplying of the Troops from
the Land.

As far as the troops have to be supplied from the land, attention is called to the following:

I. Food, clothing, housing needs and consumer goods.

.....

2) The food, housing, consumer goods, and clothing found in the zone of combat and in the rear areas are in the first place at the disposal of IVa in order to satisfy the immediate needs of the troops. (see, however, No. 3)

3) In order to facilitate the possibility of removal of food stocks at a later date, the supplies required for the immediate needs of the troops are, as far as possible, not to be taken from stocks which are in a generally favorable transport location or in a locatio favorable for shipment to Germany. (Along main railways and waterways, in harbors, especially Baltic harbors, in the border states, in the vicinity of the German borders.)

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4) All food, housing, consumer goods and clothing stocks which are not taken over in the zone of combat and the army rear areas by IVa and its agencies for the immediate use of the troops will be put at the disposal of IV Wi, which thereby will be made responsible for care and transfer to the economic agencies next in line.

5) In the army rear area the economic agencies which are taking over the preliminary work done by IV Wi will exclusively be charged with finding, securing, and caring for the food, housing, consumer goods, and clothing stocks. Assignment to the troops will be made through the Wi agencies to the native food supply agencies, which will determine the requirements of the troops of all Wehrmacht units and report them to the competent local economic agencies. These will regulate the covering of demands.

.....

II. Fuel and tires.

a) The troops will resort to the stocks found by them.

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H0668-0091

Only in an emergency can the following be used:

a) stocks of the gas, water, electricity, and mine facilities

b) gasoline and lubricants for farms and vital industries

c) stocks in the motor tractor stations.

.....

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War Booty, Services for Pay, Wehrmacht
Booty, Prizes.

I. General.

1) Although according to the Hague Rules on Land Warfare (Haager Landkriegsordnung) the entire movable property of the enemy state can be taken away as war booty without compensation, for the time being only the movable property of the enemy armed forces shall be treated as war booty. Other movable property of the state may be used by the troops in case of need, but it is to be treated as private property and to be paid for when claimed or requisitioned.

2) The payment is to be made for values up to 1000 RM in Reich treasury notes (Reichskassenscheine), for amounts exceeding 1000 RM by issuance of receipts.

Receipts may be issued by any agency in the rank of battalion or higher, unless exceptions have to be made due to the battle situation or unless further instructions are issued by the OKH (Army High Command).

3) When taking over property for which there is no owner, a receipt will be given to the senior member of the community or a report will be made to the military administration headquarters (Feldkommandantur).

4) With the establishment of the military administration headquarters (Feldkommandanturen) and the native economic agencies, the latter will be charged, in connection with the military agencies, with procuring and making available the requirements of the troops from the Economy. In urgent cases the troops may still secure their immediate needs themselves. As far as possible, the competent local military administration headquarters will be notified in such a case.

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Raw Materials, Allocation of Goods.

An exactly regulated control of [illegible]duction and goods by the use of special merchandise c[illegible]ies will not be considered, as far as the new te[illegible]ories to be occupied are concerned, with the possible [illegible]ption of the Baltic states.

.....

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C) All raw materials, processed and half-processed goods useful to us are to be withdrawn from the market. This will be initiated by the IV Wi's and the economic agencies through suitable measures, such as simple appeals and orders, decrees for confiscation, or military guard or both.

Money and Credit System.

.....

2) Gold reserves and foreign currency are to be secured. Further action will be taken by the economic command on instructions.

.....

5) Reich Credit Banks (Reichskreditkassen) will be established as soon as possible. They are personally and objectively under the jurisdiction of the Chief Administration of the Reich Credit Banks in Berlin. The Reich Credit Banks are charged with the regulation of the money and credit system. They will discharge their duties with Reich Credit Bank notes which will be issued in 50, 20, 5, 2, 1 and 0.50 RM denominations. The Reich Credit Bank notes are legal tender along with the currency of the country. The rate of exchange of the Reichsmark to the currency of the country will be fixed through decree by the authorities in charge.

The Reich Credit Bank notes also serve to keep the economy of the occupied country in operation, as far as this is important for us in the interest of peace and order, as well as to satisfy and balance the money requirements of the German troops. The first will be

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achieved by granting credit to industrial and other enterprises as well as to financial institutions or to state and district administrative organs, if the granting of credit is in the German interest (cf No. 3).

The financial institutions of the occupied countries are also to be induced to open accounts with the Reich Credit Banks.

The army has been ordered to pay its troops, after they cross the border, only with Reich Credit Bank notes or with the currency of the foreign country and to use German money only in the smallest denominations of 10, 5, 2 and 1 Reichspfennig if the foreign change is not available.

The money in the hands of the soldiers at the time of the invasion, in the amount of more than 0.50 RM, has to be exchanged for Reich Credit Bank notes at the nearest Reich Credit Bank by the finance office of the troops.

6) The Army has orders to see to it that the soldiers for their part pay in the occupied territory only with Reich Credit Bank notes or with the currency of the foreign country at the established rate of exchange. A decree will be issued in due time to the effect that i the occupied territory, along with the currency of the foreign country, the Reichsmark in the form of

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Reich Credit Bank notes will also be a legal tender and what the rate of exchange will be.

7) The maintenance of the rate of exchange of the Reich Credit Bank notes is especially important. The way they are accepted by the population is therefore carefully to be observed. Should any difficulties arise of the kind that the population refuses to accept Reich Credit Bank notes at all or only at another than the fixed rate of exchange, this must if necessary be counteracted by punishment. The Economic agencies will report about such incidents.
For the maintenance of the rate of exchange it is also requisite in case of subscription to forced loans and also when selling merchandise to the population to demand not only the currency of the foreign country but also to accept Reich Credit Bank notes at the rate of exchange established by us.

.....

9) The Reich Credit Banks will work in closest co-operation with the Economic agencies. They have, notwithstanding the fact that they are under the jurisdiction of the chief administration of the Reich Credit Banks - to bring their measures into line with the intentions of the Economic inspector with regard to the Money and Credit system.

Page 25 Foreign Trade and Exchange.

1) General.

With regard to the question of Trade and Exchange between the occupied territories and third countries it must be taken into account, that all surplus goods are on principle intended for German consumption. So far as removal is impossible, the goods will be, for the time being, stacked and secured, and be held ready for later removal. Therefore trade between the occupied territories and third countries is, for the time being, basically impossible. Directives for carrying on trade at a later date, with third countries in the interest of Germany, will be given as soon as the situation is clearer.

.....

Page 26 Price Control.

A decree or announcement of a most simple character will prohibit raising prices and other compensations (also wages) and make it a punishable offense. This is only a temporary solution. A change of prices which are subject to political conditions will have to be considered.
For agricultural products, the following rates are fixed, which may not be exceeded in the occupied territories.

The IV wi and the economic agencies will look after their publication. Food purchases for the troops as well are to be made at the established prices only.

1) Field products, prices per 100 kg:

Wheat	140	Rubel
Rye	120	"
100% Ground rye.	145	"
Barley	110	"
Oats	120	"
Corn	100	"
Peas	160	"
Millet	100	"
Buckwheat	130	"
Potatoes	50	"
Hay	30	"
Straw	15	"

2) Processed Products, prices per 100 kg:

80% Wheat flour	200	Rubel
65% Rye flour	155	"
Sugar	400	"

3) Animals (live)

Cattle (per 100 kg.)	500	Rubel
Hogs (per 100 ")	600	"
Calves (each)	250	"
Sheep (each)	200	"

4) Dairy products

Milk (per l.)	1	Rubel
Butter (per kg.)	44	"

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT
NO. 1743-PS

1 March 46

I, EVERETT V. CUNNINGHAM, Civ., B 210795, and MARTHA VON GRONFELD, Civ., X-046272, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of Document No. 1743-PS.

EVERETT V. CUNNINGHAM
Civ., B 210795

MARTHA VON GRONFELD
Civ., X-046272

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Exhibit Goering No 26

From the

note of the German Reich Cabinet
to the French Government concerning
the treatment of German prisoners
of war in France dated 30 May 1940

(Quoted from: "Dokumente deutscher
Politik"- "Documents on German Policy"
-, volume 8, part I,
Berlin 1943, pp. 171/173)

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Exhibit Goering No 26

Excerpt from the
Note of the German Government to the French Government Concerning the treatment of German Prisoners of War in France, dated 3o May 194o.

This treatment of wounded German soldiers does not represent individual cases which could be traced to arbitrary actions and cruelty on the part of the lower French ranks. The French policemen applying shackles to German officers have pointed out that this was being on the express instructions of their superiors. In correspondance with the above, a secret order of the General staff (2nd Bureau) of the French 9th Army Nr. 18o/2 of 13 April 194o, captured by German troops, proves that the pitiless treatment of captured wounded German soldiers of the Air forces and parachute troops is entirely in accordance with the intentions of the responsible higher headquarters of the French Army and that these had given corresponding orders to the French troops. For this secret order shows clearly that as a matter of principle, such wounded German soldiers were not to receive immediately medical treatment, but that primarily all possibilities were to be utilized to extort military information from them.

(Doc. German Pol. Vo. 8, part 1, Berlin 143, pp. 171/173)

I certify that the above reproduced document is a true copy from the note of the German Government to the French Government concerning the treatment of German prisoners of war dated 3o May 194o. (Quoted from Documents of German Politics, Vol. 7, Part 1, Berlin 1943, pp. 171/173).

Nuernberg, 23 February 1946

signed: Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)

Deft's. No. 6
Filed March 22, 1946

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Exhibit Goering No 27

Affidavit
of Generaloberstabsrichter a.D.
(Lt.General,JAGO, retired)
Dr. Rudolf L e h m a n n
dated 21 February 1946

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Exh. Goering Nr. 27

Affidavit of the former Lt. General Dr. Rudolf Lehmann JAGO, concerning Reich Marshal Goering in his capacity as Supreme Judge.

I. On several occasions I saw the Reich Marshal presiding over important court proceedings; at one trial I participated myself as a judge, at the others I was his counsel and listened to the proceedings.

I further know the R.M. from several occasions when reports were made to him as the senior officer of the Armed Forces in order to obtain his opinion on specific questions and from a few other cases which had been submitted to him for clarification or decision.

Finally I have regularly read the notes on the reports to the R.M. which were kept by his legal adviser, the Chief of the Legal Department of the Air Forces.

Accordingly, I do not know the R.M. as Supreme Judge as well as his own legal adviser knows him - and in legal matters of the Air Forces only indirectly through the latter's notes and descriptions - but yet well enough to permit myself to express my opinion of him.

II. I have the following opinion of him:

Originally the R.M. took a negative attitude towards lawyers. He was evidently influenced by the Fuehrer. The more he occupied himself with legal matters of the Air Forces the more his attitude was changed. Towards the end of the war, the R.M. was one of the high commanders who liked to consult lawyers. He took special interest in the legal matters of the Air Forces and attached great importance to them.

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He assigned to its legal department intricate cases for investigation if he was skeptical of the reports of other offices. Even though he did occasionally curse the lawyers vigorously as a soldier will do, it did not change his basic attitude.

The R.M. used to inform himself thoroughly on the matters in which I had to deal with him. He spent an unusual amount of time on these matters. The conference took a quiet and objective course even when considerable differences of opinion arose with occasional temperamental outbursts. The RM would hear all objections. Even if he approached a matter with a pre-conceived opinion, he would still be willing to discuss it. He thought in a definitely objective soldierly way; his common sense helped him greatly. Important decisions were made in earnest after thorough discussions. (As for that we heard much harsh criticism about him; in his other duties he was often reproached with laziness and lack of seriousness. We have always told ourselves that in our line of duties these reproaches were not warranted.)

III. Concerning the administration of justice within the air forces the R.M. reserved for himself many cases for his own confirmation of the sentence including all death-sentences. In passing judgment on individual cases - inspite of the harshness the Fuehrer demanded of all Judges - he was still inclined to show occasional leniency. In cases of treason and especially in moral crimes he showed relentless severity. I know from the records that in severe cases of rape he would often quash a sentence because he considered a death sentence as mandatory. It did not matter whether the woman involved was from Germany or from the occupied territories. I believe to remember at least one case in the records where he even changed the manner of execution and

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ordered that the soldier be hanged in the Russian village in which he had committed the rape.

IV. When presiding at a trial the RH was very lively but benevolent; also in his recommendations for mercy to the Fuehrer.

V. In his own decisions the RH, no doubt, often acted intentionally contrary to the thoughts and demands of the Fuehrer, especially in political matters which he judged so much more mildly - and in cases of transgression against inhabitants which he judged much more harshly than the Fuehrer.

VI. I have often discussed the personality of RH with his legal adviser, a very experienced, quiet and conscientious lawyer as well as with the Chief Military Prosecutor (Oberreichskriegsanwalt) who was distinguished by the same qualities and was often with him. We were of one opinion about the RH.

signed: Dr. Lehmann

21.2.1946.

I certify herewith that the affidavit is a true copy of the original in my possession.

Nurnberg, 22 February 1946.

signed: Dr. Stahmer

(Dr. Otto Stahmer)